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ABSTRACT 
 
We provide large sample evidence that credible hedge commitments reduce the agency 
costs of debt and that accounting conservatism enhances hedge commitments. We 
examine 2,338 bank loans entered into by 263 mandatory derivative users that are 
contractually obligated by interest rate protection covenants, 709 voluntary derivative 
users, and 1,366 non-users. We show that loan contracts are more likely to include 
interest rate protection covenants when borrowers are less likely to maintain the hedge 
position once the financing is completed. We find that borrowers who credibly commit to 
hedge using the covenants significantly reduce their interest rates.  While we do not find 
an average interest savings for voluntary derivative users, we do find a reduction in their 
loan rates when they practice conservative financial reporting.  Our results suggest that 
accounting conservatism helps borrowers resolve shareholder-creditor conflicts by 
committing to maintain their hedge positions after completing debt financing.  
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1.  Introduction 
We investigate whether borrowers can reduce the agency costs of debt by credibly 
committing to hedge interest rate risk using derivatives that fix the interest rates on their floating-
rate syndicated loans. Hedging reduces debt costs by decreasing default probabilities (Mayers 
and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985) and by generating more stable internal cash flows that 
alleviate underinvestment problems arising from reliance on costly external financing (Froot et 
al. 1993).  Although hedging increases total firm value, it redistributes wealth from equity 
holders to debt holders making it difficult for borrowers to convince lenders that they will 
maintain the hedge position once the financing is completed (Smith and Stultz, 1985). Risky 
borrowers have incentives to increase risk after debt issuance because of shareholders’ limited 
liability (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Doherty (2000) argues that the ability to obtain external 
financing may critically depend on whether firms can credibly commit to hedge.  
We examine two hedge commitment mechanisms available to borrowers. Specifically, 
we consider interest rate protection covenants, which contractually obligate borrowers to use 
derivatives to fix the rates on their variable rate debt, and borrower accounting conservatism as 
commitment devices. Interest rate protection covenants provide a straightforward hedge 
commitment, since unwinding the required derivative contracts would result in a covenant 
violation that allows lenders to call the debt. Accounting conservatism provides a more indirect 
hedge commitment, but we argue that there is more than one reason why accounting 
conservatism helps borrowers commit to hedge. 
In some circumstances, the desire to increase reported earnings could provide borrowers 
with incentives to unwind their hedge positions. The incentive will be the strongest when lenders 
are most concerned with the borrower’s interest rate exposure, which occurs during rising 
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interest rate environments, since an increase in interest rates leads to an unrecognized gain on 
variable-to-fixed rate swap hedges. 1 Chen et al. (2007) show that firms with conservative 
accounting are less likely to engage in upward earnings management. Conservative accounting 
may also provide a hedging commitment by facilitating timely debt covenant violations that 
transfer control rights to creditors in the event of economic losses (Watts, 2003; Zhang, 2008; 
Beatty et al., 2008; Nicolaev, 2010). This suggests that the benefit to shareholders of increasing 
risk decreases with accounting conservatism (Loktionov, 2009).   We expect that the relatively 
higher costs of altering accounting conservatism compared to derivative holdings will allow 
accounting conservatism to enhance the ability to commit to hedge positions.   
We investigate the importance of commitment in reducing agency costs of debt by 
examining how derivate use affects syndicated loan interest rate spreads for two types of 
derivative users: those required by interest rate protection covenants to fix the rates on their 
syndicated loans (hereafter mandatory users), and those who voluntarily fix their debt rates in the 
absence of these covenants (hereafter voluntary  users).  We also consider whether derivative 
users’ interest rate savings vary cross-sectionally with their accounting conservatism. Since 
borrowers can choose to use derivatives and to use interest rate protection covenants, we first 
model borrowers’ choice of each of these possibilities versus the choice not to use derivatives. 
We control for these choices in our interest rate spread analyses. We examine borrowers’ 
derivative use choice using a bivariate probit model that accounts for the interdependence 
between derivative use and the inclusion of interest rate protection covenants in the loan 
contracts.  We adopt an instrumental variables approach and incorporate the estimates from these 
models in our analysis of whether a hedge commitment affects borrowing rates. 
                                                
1 Since virtually all syndicated loans charge variable-rates, banks are more concerned about borrowers’ ability to 
fulfill interests payment obligations when interest rates increase. 
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To account for the endogeneity in the derivative use choices, we identify two plausible 
instruments that are related to firms’ hedging decisions, but are unlikely related to loan pricing. 
Our first instrument for derivative use is the before-financing marginal tax rate. Consistent with 
previous research, we argue that the before-financing tax rate will be unrelated to the interest 
rates charged on the new loans. Our second instrument related to the choice of fixed versus 
floating rate debt is the proportion of existing debt maturing in more than one year. A syndicated 
loan with an interest rate swap is equivalent to fixed rate debt with a call option. Previous 
research shows that the maturity of existing debt predicts both the choice of fixed rate debt over 
floating rate debt (Denis and Mihov 2003) and the choice to issue fixed rate debt that is callable 
for reasons other than interest rate changes (Thatcher 1985).  
Consistent with previous research, we find larger firms with higher marginal tax rates and 
higher leverage ratios are more likely to use derivatives, suggesting that the decision to use 
derivatives is affected by scale economies, expected tax liabilities, and agency conflicts of debt.   
We extend the previous hedging literature by examining factors related to hedge commitments.  
Our bivariate probit model explicitly examines why some loan contracts include interest rate 
protection covenants while others do not. We find that firms with a natural exposure to interest 
risk, captured by a negative correlation between sales and interest rate changes, are more likely 
to be mandatory users. We also examine the role of accounting conservatism in the derivative 
use decision and find that, consistent with what would be expected if conservatism serves as a 
commitment mechanism, this association is dependent on the extent of accounting conservatism 
for voluntary users but not for mandatory users.  We also predict that distressed firms will need a 
credible commitment mechanism to convince lenders that they will continue to hedge after they 
enter the loan. Consistent with this prediction, we find that interest rate protection covenants are 
  4 
more likely for high default risk borrowers.  In particular, mandatory users are smaller, less 
profitable firms with lower credit ratings.  They also have stricter contract terms including a 
greater number of other covenants and a higher likelihood of a collateral requirement. 
Specifically, 91% of loans with interest rate protection covenants also require collateral, 
compared with 60% for non-users and 51% for voluntary users. Overall, these results suggest 
that hedging determinants and incentives are very different for borrowers who hedge voluntarily 
compared to those with covenants requiring them to hedge.  
If commitment is important in mitigating agency conflicts and the interest rate protection 
covenant serves as an effective commitment mechanism, then we expect to find reduced costs of 
debt for mandatory users. For voluntary users we expect any interest rate reduction will likely 
depend on the extent of their commitment to hedge as reflected in their accounting conservatism. 
Using different measures of accounting conservatism, we find empirical results consistent with 
these predictions.  Overall, we find that interest rates are lower for loans with interest rate 
protection covenants relative to both non-users and voluntary users. In contrast, we do not find 
evidence that voluntary users reduce their loan rates on average, despite their derivative use. 
Consistent with the argument that accounting conservatism enhances the hedge commitment, we 
find the interest rate reduction for voluntary users increases with their accounting conservatism.  
In contrast, we do not find this effect for mandatory users.  Finding that the costs of debt are 
reduced only for derivative users that can commit to hedge demonstrates that commitment is an 
important factor in solving conflicts between shareholders and debt holders.  
Our study makes three contributions.  First, by examining a setting where firms are 
contractually obligated to use derivatives, we provide large-sample evidence of the importance 
of a credible hedge commitment in reducing agency costs of debt. Previous research emphasizes 
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the importance of hedge commitment and acknowledges that debt covenants might provide a 
credible commitment mechanism (Smith and Stulz, 1995; Campbell and Kracaw, 1990; 
Bessembinder, 1991; Doherty, 2000).  However, explicit study of how a hedge commitment 
affects firms’ financing activities has been limited to Chidambaran et al. (2001) who examine a 
single gold mining firm’s pre-commit to hedge using commodity-linked bonds.  We complement 
their study by investigating a broader setting that allows firms to achieve a similar commitment 
by including hedging covenants in their loan contracts.  
Second, by separately studying firms that are contractually obligated to hedge and firms 
that hedge voluntarily, we extend previous corporate risk management research that implicitly 
assumes that all derivative use is voluntary.2      
Third, we contribute to the literature on the role of accounting conservatism in facilitating 
efficient debt contracting by identifying a new channel through which accounting conservatism 
reduces costs of debt by enhancing hedge commitment for voluntary users. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a background and brief literature 
review.  We develop our hypotheses in Section 3.  Section 4 describes our sample selection and 
research design.  We present the empirical results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Background and Literature Review 
2.1   Background 
2.1.1  Syndicated Loan Floating Interest Rates 
                                                
2 An exception is Geczy et al. (1997), who recognize that lenders may require borrowers to follow certain hedging 
strategies. They note that at least four of their sample firms have interest rate hedge covenants. However, Geczy et 
al. (1997) do not specifically investigate these mandatory derivative users.   
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 Most syndicated loans charge floating interest rates. In the Handbook of Loan 
Syndications and Trading, Taylor and Sansone (2006) summarize the characteristics of 
syndicated loans as follows: 
Floating Interest Rate: The market convention today is a rate that is quoted as a spread 
over a floating-rate index.  That index is the three- or six- month LIBOR (London 
Interbank Offered Rate).  In the past, other indexes have been used, such as the prime 
rate, banker’s acceptance rates, or even the fed funds rate. … 
 
Prepayment without penalty: Since the loans are floating rate, they carry the “free 
option” of being “called”.  In other words, the loans can be repaid at any time without 
penalty.  Those prepayments generally occur at interest payment dates to avoid the 
breakage cost of the index rate setting. 
 
The handbook suggests that syndicated loans charge floating rates to facilitate prepayment 
without penalty.  Public debt typically charges fixed rates and requires a call premium. 
 Vickery (2008) provides two alternative rationales for why banks might prefer to lend at 
floating rates.  First, he argues that in periods of rising rates there is an outflow of deposits from 
the banking system, which banks cannot costlessly replace with other sources of finance.  
Lending at a floating rate would at least partially hedge this funding risk. Second, he argues that 
floating rate business loans can be used to hedge the maturity mismatch between deposits and 
long-term mortgage loans.  We do not explore these alternative explanations for why banks 
virtually always lend at floating rates, but instead take this as a given in the market we study.  
2.1.2 Interest Rate Protection Covenants 
 Interest rate protection covenants are affirmative covenants requiring borrowers to use 
derivative contracts to effectively convert their floating-rate debt into fixed-rate debt.  Therefore, 
when a bank loan contract includes an interest rate protection covenant, the borrower is in 
essence borrowing at a fixed rate and is no longer subject to interest rate fluctuation risk.  The 
following is an example of a bank loan contract that requires interest rate protection.  Lecroy’s 
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2004 Credit Agreement states that: 
The Borrower will, within 90 days from the Funding Date, enter into one or more Interest 
Rate Protection Agreements covering the interest payable with respect to at least 50 
percent of the outstanding principal amount of the Term Loan for a period of at least three 
years. 
 
Where an  
"Interest Rate Protection Agreement" shall mean any interest rate swap agreement, 
interest rate cap agreement, interest rate collar agreement, interest rate hedging 
agreement or other similar agreement or arrangement. 
 
 This interest rate protection covenant only applies to the new borrowing.  In other cases, 
the covenant may apply to the firm’s entire outstanding debt.  For example, GCI Holdings 1997 
Credit Agreement requires that: 
By no later than 60 days after the Closing Date, the Borrower or GCII will enter into an 
Interest Hedge Agreement on terms acceptable to the Administrative Agent providing for 
interest rate protection for not less than three years for 50% of Total Debt on such date.  
 
A covenant that requires interest rate protection for all outstanding debt eliminates interest rate 
fluctuation risk, not only for the current borrowing, but also for all the debt on the balance sheet.  
2.1.3  Accounting for Pay-fixed Swaps 
 Hedge accounting for pay-fixed receive-variable interest rate swaps recognizes the 
current period cash flows from the swaps as an adjustment to the interest expense associated with 
the hedged debt.  Changes in the fair value of future swap payments are generally not recognized 
in income. Under certain circumstances, borrowers could recognize gains on these contracts in 
the income statement. Specifically, a gain can be recorded in income when the swap is settled if 
the borrower can argue that it is probable that the forecasted variable interest payments on the 
debt will not occur. In an increasing interest rate environment, this accounting treatment provides  
an incentive for borrowers who want to increase reported earnings to settle the hedge position 
before maturity.  
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 The incentives to undo hedge positions provided by hedge accounting occur in periods of 
rising interest rates when banks are the most concerned about the borrowers’ ability to make 
their interest payments. Banks are less likely to be concerned with borrowers’ incentives to 
unwind hedge positions in a declining rate environment because the risk that borrowers cannot 
make their interest payments is lower when rates decline.3  
 In short, the accounting treatment for interest rate derivatives related to a floating rate 
loan may exacerbate borrowers’ risk shifting incentives. Borrowers interested in managing 
earnings upward have greater incentives to unwind their hedge positions in a rising interest rate 
environment, a time when they need interest rate protection the most.  
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Hedging, Commitment, and Agency Costs of Debt  
The hedging literature includes several theories of how hedging can increase firm value 
by reducing creditor-shareholder conflicts.  Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that hedging reduces 
the probability and cost of financial distress by reducing cash flow volatility.  However, they 
point out that it is difficult for firms to convince creditors that they will maintain the hedge after 
the debt issuance because hedging also redistributes wealth from shareholders to debt holders, 
Froot et al. (1993) propose that the more stable cash flows created by hedging can mitigate 
underinvestment problems that arise when firms with investment opportunities face financial 
constraints.  Doherty (2000) argues that the ability to obtain external financing may depend on 
whether firms can credibly commit to hedge.   
The theoretical research on hedging suggests a positive association between firms’ 
financial constraints and hedging activities.  However, the empirical evidence is mixed.  For 
example, Nance et al. (1993) find that derivative users are larger and face more convex tax 
                                                
3 For example, borrowers may want to smooth the earnings.  
  9 
functions, but find no evidence of higher leverage ratios that might suggest greater financial 
constraints.  In contrast, Haushalter (2000) finds the leverage ratio to be the most significant 
factor explaining the hedge ratio for 100 oil and gas producers.  In summarizing the findings for 
non-financial firms’ incentives to use derivatives, Bartram et al. (2009) note that “as a whole, the 
findings of empirical studies remain controversial because the conclusions are largely sample 
specific.” They argue that lack of power produces the mixed findings. 
By focusing on debt covenants that obligate firms to hedge interest rate risk and the 
potential reduction in borrowing rates, our paper provides a more powerful setting to examine 
whether hedging reduces the agency costs of debt. Prior conflicting findings could also reflect 
the fact that theses studies have largely ignored the commitment issue, which Smith and Stulz 
(1985) argue to be important given firms’ strong incentives to unwind hedges once financing is 
obtained. Creditors who know this ex ante will not factor the credit enhancement into the debt 
pricing unless the firm is able to credibly commit to maintain the hedge.  Interest rate protection 
covenants provide us the setting to address the commitment issue.   
 One study that recognizes the importance of commitment is Chidambaran et al. (2001).  
They study Freeport McMoran’s  (a gold mining company) gold-linked depository shares issued 
in 1993 and 1994.  The gold-linked bonds essentially bundle financing and hedging together to 
address the commitment problem.  Despite being financially constrained, Freeport McMoran 
successfully raised $359 million at a favorable rate through the gold-denominated bonds.  
Chidambaran et al. (2001) focus on a special case that allows a commodity company to pre-
commit to hedge through commodity-linked bonds.  We complement their study by investigating 
a more widespread mechanism that allows firms to achieve the same commitment by accepting 
hedging covenants in their loans. 
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2.2.2  Accounting Conservatism and Debt 
Watts (2003a, b) argue that one of the most important economic rationales for accounting 
conservatism is to improve the efficiency of debt contracts.  Consistent with this argument, Chen 
et al. (2007) theorize that, when accounting numbers serve both an equity valuation role and a 
stewardship role, managers have incentives to engage in earnings management and such 
manipulation leads to inferior risk sharing. They show that when the accounting regime is 
unbiased and there is uncertainty about the future payoff of the firm, managers have incentives to 
manage the accounting earnings upward to induce more favorable investors’ belief about the 
firm’s prospects. However, the degree of earnings manipulation is lower in the conservative 
accounting regime because observing a low accounting earnings number does not necessarily 
mean that the true economic earnings are as low. The reduction in earnings management 
improves risk sharing, and hence contract efficiency.  
Under hedge accounting, gains or losses arising from price fluctuations on pay-fixed 
swaps are not recognized in income. Kangeretnam et al. (2009) find that hedge gains and losses 
that are not recorded in income are not priced by the equity market. This suggests that managers 
may have an incentive to use hedge settlement to produce an immediate accounting gain that will 
be included in net income. 
Empirical research has identified several channels through which accounting 
conservatism mitigates agency costs of debt. For example, Ahmed et al. (2002) find that 
accounting conservatism mitigates bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy. Beatty 
et al. (2008) find that accounting conservatism complements conservative contract modifications 
in loan contracts, suggesting that contract modifications alone do not fulfill the contracting 
demand. Loktionov (2009) shows that conservative reporting reduces risk shifting in distressed 
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firms. Zhang (2008) documents that in the event of economic losses, conservative accounting 
produces more timely transfers of control rights to banks through covenant violations. Her 
findings suggest that by recognizing bad news more quickly, conservative financial reports 
facilitate the role of covenants and thus, reduce creditors’ risk.  Nikolaev (2010) provides 
consistent evidence in the bond markets that firms with more covenants in their public debt 
exhibit higher level of accounting conservatism.  
Our study adds to the literature by identifying a new channel through which conservative 
financial reporting enhances debt contracting.  In contrast to previous studies, we examine the 
interaction between accounting conservatism and commitment to risk management in alleviating 
shareholder-creditor conflicts. We show that accounting conservatism enhances a borrower’s 
ability to commit to hedge and therefore reduces their costs of debt.4 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
We examine the role of a commitment to hedge in reducing agency costs of debt.  
Hedging reduces cash flow variability, resulting in lower default risk and higher debt capacity.  
However, economic theories suggest that firms with higher default risk tend to engage in risk-
shifting activities after the debt financing is completed.  Specifically, risky borrowers have 
incentives to unwind hedge positions ex-post.  Both borrowers and creditors acknowledge this 
tendency and design mechanisms to address this issue. An interest rate protection covenant 
provides one such mechanism. By ensuring borrowers’ commitments to maintain hedge positions 
ex-post, interest rate protection covenants mitigate agency conflicts between creditors and 
                                                
4 Biddle et al. (2011) document that accounting conservatism reduces the downside risk of operating cash flows 
through increased cash holdings, reduced customer bargaining power, and increased hedge usage. We differ from 
Biddle et al. (2011) by separately analyzing mandatory users and voluntary users and by examining how accounting 
conservatism serves as a commitment mechanism.   
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shareholders and therefore should reduce agency costs of debt. We hypothesize that by accepting 
the covenants, mandatory users credibly commit to hedge and enjoy lower funding costs.  
H1:  Ceteris paribus, borrowers that commit to maintain hedge positions through interest 
rate protection covenants enjoy lower interest rates relative to both non-users and 
voluntary users.  
 
For voluntary users, we examine whether accounting conservatism enhances their ability 
to commit to hedge.  Without covenant restrictions, the use of derivatives to reduce cash flow 
volatility is not credible because of borrowers incentives to unwind their positions once debt 
financing is completed. Lenders recognize this and will not factor the hedging activities into debt 
pricing. However, accounting conservatism increases the likelihood that earnings will reflect the 
economic losses resulting from increases in the volatility of cash flows. Lower earnings and 
financial numbers will trigger covenant violations, allowing lenders to intervene and take 
remedial actions. Therefore, the cost of risk-shifting activities increases in the level of 
accounting conservatism.  Consistent with this argument, Loktionov (2009) find that distressed 
firms with more conservative accounting system are less likely to engage in risk-shifting 
activities.  In addition to the risk-taking incentive, borrowers may also unwind their hedge 
positions to recognize gains in the income statement when interest rates increase.  Chen et al. 
(2007) show that firms with conservative accounting reporting are less likely to engage in 
income increasing earning management.  Therefore, we expect borrowers with conservative 
accounting are less likely to unwind their hedge positions after they complete their financing. 
For accounting conservatism to serve as a hedge commitment mechanism, it requires that 
conservatism cannot be changed ex-post.  Previous research suggests that changing financial 
reporting conservatism is costly, at least relative to the cost of changing derivative positions. For 
contracting purposes change conservatism may not be possible under “fixed GAAP” where the 
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impact of changes in accounting methods on financial numbers are excluded when calculating 
covenant violations (Mohrman 1996; Beatty et al. 2002).  In addition, litigation risk may increase 
when firms accounting practice becomes more aggressive, especially when default risk is high.  
Finally, the finding that accounting conservatism reduces ex-ante debt costs implicitly support 
the argument that borrowers can pre-commit to certain conservatism levels. Consistent with 
these arguments, Beatty et al. (2008) do not find that firms reduce their conservatism level after 
entering loan contracts. In summary, we expect voluntary users with more conservative 
accounting system to have higher ability to commit to hedge and enjoy reduced costs of debt.  
H2:  Ceteris paribus, the interest savings for voluntary users relative to non-users are 
positively associated with accounting conservatism.  
 
Note that we do not have a directional prediction comparing the interest savings between 
mandatory users and voluntary users who also engage in conservative reporting. Both derivative 
users commit to hedge – one uses interest rate protection covenant, and the other uses 
conservative accounting practices. If by being conservative, voluntary users achieve the same 
commitment level as mandatory users, we would expect these two groups of borrowers to have 
the same magnitude of interest savings. In contrast, if conservatism is not as strong of a 
commitment mechanism as interest protection covenants, we would expect mandatory users to 
achieve bigger interest savings than voluntary uses who employ conservative accounting.    
 
4. Data and Research Design 
4.1  Sample Selection 
We use Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan and SEC’s EDGAR databases to construct 
our sample.  The Dealscan “Tear Sheets” provide extensive covenant information for a sub-
sample of loans in the database.  We identify interest rate protection covenants in 445 of the 
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2,188 Tear Sheets from 1995 to 2005.  We supplement the Tear Sheets sample by conducting a 
search of all credit agreements included as material contract exhibits in 10-K and 8-K filings 
during the same time period.  Our search identifies 10,059 credit agreements, of which 1,188 
have interest rate protection covenants. We manually verify the accuracy of the search results by 
reading the covenant section of the 1,188 credit agreements. We further require our sample firms 
to be non-financial firms covered by LPC and COMPUSTAT.  Using these selection criteria, we 
obtain a sample of 4,018 loans, of which 415 include interest rate protection covenants (i.e., 
mandatory users).  
For the 3,603 loans without an interest rate protection covenant, we read the companies’ 
10-K filings both in the year immediately before the borrowing and in the year of the borrowing 
to identify voluntary users.  First, we identify firms that already have interest rate derivative 
instruments outstanding at the time of the loan contract. We expect that if commitment is not an 
issue, banks will factor the borrower’s existing derivative positions into the loan pricing.  
Second, we consider the possibility that companies may hedge after the loan origination and 
identify firms that enter new variable to fixed rate derivative instruments (including swaps, caps, 
and collars) to hedge the new loan.5 We include both types of voluntary users in our analysis.   
After requiring data for constructing at least one accounting conservatism measure and 
other non-missing information on firm and loan characteristics used in the regression analysis, 
we have in total 2,338 bank loans consisting of 263 mandatory users, 709 voluntary users, and 
1,366 non-users. Table 1 Panel A reports the sample selection process. All the loans in the 
sample are based on floating rates that vary with the LIBOR.  Table 1 Panel B reports the 
                                                
5 We can clearly identify voluntary users when firms explicitly disclose the purpose of the new derivative contracts 
in their 10-K filings.  When firms do not disclose the purpose of their derivative contracts, we examine the change in 
the notional amount of the variable-to-fixed derivative instruments (swaps, caps, and collars) between the fiscal year 
of loan origination and the fiscal year prior to loan origination.  If the change in the notional amount is positive, we 
consider the loan to have been (at least partially) swapped to fixed-rate. 
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industry distribution for mandatory users, voluntary users, and non-users, respectively.  
Mandatory users represent a smaller percentage of firms in the mining and construction industry 
(5.32%) relative to voluntary users (9.73%) and non-users (11.56%). Transportation, 
communication, and utilities  include more mandatory users (19.39%) and voluntary users 
(15.79%) than non-users (13.47%).  Finally, the personal and business services industry is 
comprised of more mandatory users (14.45%) than voluntary users (8.60%) and non-users 
(12.66%).  Overall, all three groups consist of firms across various industries and exhibit similar 
industry representation.  
4.2  Research Design 
4.2.1   Determinants of Derivative Use and Mandatory Derivative Use  
To test our main hypothesis that hedge commitments reduce interest rates, we adopt an 
instrumental variables approach to alleviate concerns that the loan rate outcomes and firms’ 
choices to hedge are endogenously determined. We build a bivariate probit model to first 
examine the incentives to use derivatives and the incentives to include interest rate protection 
covenants in the syndicated loan contracts.   
USE = β0Intercept + A*Instruments + β1NATURAL_P + β2NATURAL_N + 
β3CONSERV + β4CONSERV*NATURAL_P + β5CONSERV*NATURAL_N 
+ C*Firm Characteristics + D*Loan Characteristics + u                                         (1)  
 
MAND = γ0Intercept + A’*Instruments + γ1NATURAL_P +γ2NATURAL_N + 
γ3CONSERV +γ4CONSERV*NATURAL_P +γ5CONSERV*NATURAL_N 
 +C’*Firm Characteristics + D’*Loan Characteristics + v                                          (2) 
 
  
 
USE equals 1 if the borrower is a mandatory user or a voluntary user, 0 if the borrower is a non-
user. MAND equals 1 if the borrower is a mandatory user, 0 if the borrower is a voluntary user 
or non-user.   
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We identify two instruments that are related to the borrower’s propensity to use 
derivatives but are not directly related to the interest rates charged on the syndicated loans.  The 
first instrument is the marginal tax rate before financing activities (MTR) constructed following 
Graham and Mills (2007) for the loan initiation year.  Economic theory on hedging suggests 
firms hedge to reduce tax liabilities.  Prior empirical studies find firms hedge more when the 
marginal tax rate is high (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Barton 2001). Consistent with previous 
research, we argue that the before-financing tax rate will be unrelated to the rates charged on the 
new loan. Our second instrument is the proportion of existing debt maturing in more than one 
year (PROP) measured at the fiscal year end prior to loan initiation.  Thatcher (1985) shows that 
the maturity of existing debt predicts firms’ choice to issue fixed rate debt that is callable for 
reasons other than interest rate changes.  Denis and Mihov (2003) show that the maturity of 
existing debt predicts the choice of fixed rate debt over floating rate debt.  Since syndicated loans 
with variable-to-fixed rate swaps incorporate both the fixed-rate and the callable features, we 
expect the maturity of existing debt to be positively associated with the propensity of derivative 
use.  Barclay and Smith (1995) find little evidence that firms use maturity structure to signal 
credit quality.  Thus, we do not expect the existing debt maturity to be directly related to loan 
interest rates. 
We include firms’ natural hedge positions in the bivariate probit model.  Similar to 
Vickery (2008), we measure natural hedge positions (NATURAL) as the sum of the coefficients 
on current and one period lagged 12-month treasury rates from a regression of sales scaled by 
total assets on these variables, as well as a constant, time trend, and log time trend. The 
regression is estimated at the 2-digit SIC industry-year level. We expect firms to be less likely to 
hedge interest rate risk if they have a natural hedge against such risk (i.e., a negative coefficient 
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on NATURAL). We allow separate coefficients for negative natural hedge positions 
(NATURAL_N), when sales revenue decreases with increases in interest rates, and for positive 
natural hedge positions (NATURAL_P), when sales revenue increases with increases in interest 
rates. If banks are primarily concerned with  borrowers ability to fulfill interest payments in an 
increasing interest rate environment, we expect the negative association between derivative use 
and the natural hedge position to be stronger for firms with negative natural hedge positions.  
We include accounting conservatism in the first stage bivariate probit model to examine 
the role of conservatism in enhancing the hedge commitment. We follow prior literature and 
employ multiple accounting conservatism measures in our tests. Our first measure, 
CONSERV_KW, follows Khan and Watts (2009) and is constructed for each firm-year based on 
size, leverage ratio and book-to-market ratio.  Our second measure, CONSERV_SK, is the 
difference between the skewness in operating cash flows and earnings before extraordinary items 
(Givoly and Hayn 2000; Beatty et al. 2008). We measure skewness using cash flows and 
earnings information from the previous 12 quarters requiring at least 5 quarters of data prior to 
entering into the loan.  CONSERV_AC is our third measure of accounting conservatism and is 
the average non-operating accruals scaled by total assets over the 3-year period prior to loan 
origination (Givoly and Hayn 2000).  Finally, we extract the principal component of the above 
three measures as our fourth measure of accounting conservatism (CONSERV). We rank all 
these conservatism measures into deciles with higher levels indicating more conservative 
reporting. We also interact accounting conservatism with firms’ natural hedge positions to allow 
for the possibility that not all voluntary users are hedging.  Previous research finds firms may use 
derivatives to speculate (Faulkender 2005; Geczy et al. 2007).  If this is the case, accounting 
conservatism may not be directly related to derivative use. Firms with negative natural hedge 
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positions are more subject to interest rate fluctuation risk and may be less likely to speculate. 
Therefore, these firms are more likely to use conservative accounting to commit to hedge.  
Previous literature suggests that firm size, leverage, profitability, and growth options 
affect derivative use (Mian 1996; Haushalter 2000; Geczy et al. 1997). We include the following 
controls: the natural log of sale revenue (SIZE), the ratio of total debt to total assets (LEV), profit 
margin (PM), and research and development expense scaled by sales (RD). We also control for 
whether the borrower is rated (RATE) and its S&P credit ratings (SPRATE), which ranges from 
1 for AAA to 22 for D for firms with ratings and equal 0 for firms without ratings. All these firm 
characteristics are measured at the fiscal year end before loan contract initiation. Since the 
derivative use is associated with the new borrowing, we also include a set of loan characteristics: 
collateral requirements (SECURE), maturity (MATURE), loan type (TERM), secondary sales 
(SECOND), loan purpose (TAKEOVER), the number of financial covenants (NCOV), the 
number of lenders (NLENDER), and performance pricing (PERFORM). All these firm and loan 
controls are also expected to affect the loan rates in the second stage. We provide detailed 
variable definitions in Appendix I.  
4.2.2 Interest Rate Spread Model 
We estimate the following model to test our first hypothesis that a commitment to hedge 
through interest rate protection covenants reduces costs of debt. 
AISD = α0Intercept + α1USE + α2MAND + E*Firm Characteristics  
+ F*Loan Characteristics + ε                                                                       (3) 
AISD is the loan spread above LIBOR for each deal.  If one deal consists of multiple facilities, 
AISD is measured as the average across all facilities. We conduct the analysis at the deal level 
because the interest rate protection covenants apply to all facilities in a deal. Same as in equation 
(1) and (2), USE equals 1 if the borrower is a mandatory user or a voluntary user, 0 if the 
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borrower is a non-user. MAND equals 1 if the borrower is a mandatory user, 0 if the borrower is 
a voluntary user or non-user.  Since the derivative use decision is likely to be endogenously 
determined, we replace USE in model (3) with the predicted probability of USE from the first 
stage bivariate probit model.  To account for the fact that mandatory users are a subgroup of 
users, we replace MAND in model (3) with the predicted joint probability of both USE = 1 and 
MAND=1 from the first stage bivariate probit model.  
             In model (3), α1 captures the difference in interest rates between voluntary users and 
non-users; and α2 captures the difference in interest rates between mandatory users and voluntary 
users.  If commitment to hedge is important in reducing agency costs of debt and interest rate 
protection covenants serve as a credible commitment mechanism, we expect mandatory users to 
enjoy lower interest rates relative to both voluntary users and non-users (i.e., α2 < 0 and α1 + α2 < 
0). In addition, we do not expect voluntary users to receive lower interest rates (i.e., α1 = 0). 
 To test our second hypothesis that accounting conservatism facilitates voluntary users’ 
hedge commitment, we estimate the following regression. 
AISDi,t = δ0Intercept + δ1USE + δ2MAND +  
δ3CONSERV +δ4USE*CONSERV + δ5MAND*CONSERV + 
E’*Firm Characteristics + F’*Loan Characteristics+ ε                                 (4)                                           
δ4 captures how interest savings for voluntary users vary with accounting conservatism. If 
accounting conservatism enhances voluntary users’ ability to commit and a credible hedge 
commitment reduces interest rate, we expect δ4 to be negative.  (δ4 + δ5) captures how interest 
savings for mandatory users vary with accounting conservatism.  Since mandatory users already 
have committed to hedge positions through the interest rate protection covenants, they do not 
need conservatism as a commitment mechanism. Therefore, we expect (δ4 + δ5) to be 
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insignificant.  Since δ5 captures the differential impact of the accounting conservatism on loan 
rates between voluntary users and mandatory users, we expect it to be positive.  
 In equation (4) since USE and MAND are endogenous, their interaction terms 
USE*CONSERV and MAND*CONSERV are endogenous as well. As pointed out in Beaver et al. 
(2010), the extant accounting and finance literature usually instruments a function of the 
endogenous variable, not through building a separate first-stage, but via directly plugging in the 
predicted value of the endogenous variable in the function.  This approach is referred to as a 
“forbidden regression” in Wooldridge (2002), which may result in biased coefficient estimates.  
Following Wooldridge (2002) and Beaver et al. (2010), we build the following separate first-
stage models for USE*CONSERV and MAND*CONSERV. 
USE*CONSERV = 𝛼 𝑈𝑆𝐸*CONSERV + Ψ𝑋 + ℰ                       (5) 
MAND*CONSERV = 𝛽 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷*CONSERV + Θ𝑋 + ℰ               (6) 𝑈𝑆𝐸  is the predicted probability of USE =1 from the bivariate probit model and 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 is the 
predicted joint probability of both USE = 1 and MAND = 1 from the bivariate probit model. X is 
the set of exogenous variables including the constant, two instruments (MTR and PROP), and all 
firm and loan characteristics. We then use the fitted values from equations (5) and (6) to 
instrument for USE*CONSERV and MAND*CONSERV in equation (4).  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 2 reports Pearson correlations between the main variables. We find that larger 
firms are more likely to be rated and have higher before-financing marginal tax rate. Consistent 
with prior research, we find that derivative use is positively correlated with firm size and 
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leverage ratios.  However, mandatory derivative use is negatively correlated with firm size, 
suggesting mandatory users and voluntary users might be very different.  We find firms with 
higher accounting conservatism are smaller, less profitable, have higher leverage ratios, and are 
less likely to be rated. We also find that higher interest rates are imposed on borrowers that are 
smaller, less profitable, and have higher leverage. These borrowers are also more likely to be 
required to provide collateral.  We find before-financing MTR is negatively correlated with the 
interest charged on the loan, likely because firms with high marginal tax rates also have lower 
leverage and better credit ratings.  Overall, these correlations are consistent with the prior 
literature.  
Table 3 Panel A reports univariate analyses of firm characteristics and loan attributes for 
mandatory users, non-users, and voluntary users. We report the mean value of each variable; 
results based on the median values yield similar inferences and are not reported. Comparisons of 
before-financing marginal tax rates indicate that voluntary users have the highest marginal tax 
rates among the three groups of borrowers, consistent with the argument that voluntary users 
have strong incentive to hedge for tax purpose.  We find both mandatory users and voluntary 
users have higher proportion of existing debt maturing after one year relative to non-users, 
suggesting that these firms may prefer fixed rate callable debt.  Inconsistent with the argument 
that firms with natural hedge positions are less likely to hedge, we find the natural hedge position 
for voluntary users is significantly higher than both mandatory users and non-users. We do not 
find the natural hedge position to be different between mandatory users and non-users.  
We find that mandatory users have higher default risk measured at both firm and loan 
levels.  Specifically, at the firm level mandatory users are smaller, less profitable, and have 
higher leverage ratios and lower credit ratings relative to either non-users or voluntary users.  
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Using the existence of a rating as a proxy for access to bond markets (Faulkender and Petersen, 
2006), we find that mandatory users are the least likely to have access to bond markets (36%) 
compared to non-users (44%) and to voluntary users (64%).  At the loan level, mandatory users 
are charged much higher interest rates and endure more restrictive covenant conditions than both 
voluntary users and non-users.  The average interest rate charged for mandatory users is 78.3 
basis points higher than the rate for non-users and 103 basis points higher than the rate for 
voluntary users. Mandatory users are also more likely to be required to provide collateral and to 
have a higher number of covenants in their contracts. Finally, we find that bank loans with 
interest rate protection covenants are more likely to be repackaged and sold on the secondary 
loan market (48% compared with 9% of non-users and 14% of voluntary users).   
 Table 3 Panel B reports the distribution of the main variables.  On average, borrowers 
have 34% leverage ratio with 81% existing debt maturing after 1 year.  Half of the borrowers 
have credit ratings.  Collateral is required for 61% of the loans and 59% of the loans have 
performance pricing provisions.  Loan contracts have on average 4 financial covenants and 10 
participating lenders.   
Overall Table 3 suggests that loan contracts are more likely to include interest rate 
protection covenants when borrowers exhibit higher default risk. These borrowers are charged a 
higher interest rate on the loan and are subject to more restrictive covenant conditions. The 
difference in various characteristics between mandatory and voluntary users suggests that the 
two groups are likely to have very different incentives for entering derivative contracts. 
5.2  Incentives for Derivatives Use and Mandatory Derivative Use.  
Table 4 Panel A presents the first-stage bivariate probit model estimation results where 
accounting conservatism is measured as the principal component of the Khan and Watts (2009) 
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measure, the earnings skewness measure, and the non-operating accruals measure. We present 
the results under three different specifications. Consistent with the tax incentive to hedge, we 
find users have higher pre-financing marginal tax rate for two out of three model specifications.  
We do not find the marginal tax rate to be significant for mandatory users, suggesting the tax 
incentive to hedge is not associated with the probability of including interest rate protection 
covenants in the loan contracts.  Consistent with the argument that syndicated loans swapped to 
fixed rate reflect borrowers’ preference for fixed rate callable debt, we find the proportion of 
existing debt maturing after one year predicts both derivative use and mandatory derivative use.   
For mandatory derivative use, we do not find an association between firms’ natural hedge 
positions and the propensity of using derivatives if sales revenue increases in a rising interest rate 
environment (positive natural hedge position as indicated by NATURAL_P).  However, we find 
a significantly negative association between the natural hedge position and mandatory derivative 
use when borrowers’ sales revenue decreases in a rising interest rate environment (negative 
natural hedge position as indicated by NATURAL_N) for all three specifications.  Borrowers 
with negative natural hedge positions and variable rate debt suffer the most from the mismatch of 
the interest rate exposure from the assets side and the liability side. The asymmetric association 
between mandatory derivative use and borrowers’ natural hedge positions suggests that the 
borrower’s natural hedge position is important in determining interest rate protection covenant 
use. In contrast to mandatory derivative use, we find no association between derivative use and 
natural hedge positions, suggesting that some voluntary users may use derivatives to speculate.6  
In specification (2), we do not find conservative financial reporting to be associated with 
derivative use.  However, this result could be due to the fact that some borrowers use derivatives 
to speculate.  To further examine how conservative financial reporting affects firms’ hedging 
                                                
6 Faulkender (2005) also finds no association between derivative use and the firm’s natural hedge positions.  
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decisions, we include the interaction term between conservatism and firms natural hedge 
positions in specification (3).7  For mandatory users, the estimated coefficients on 
CONSERV*NATURAL_P and CONSERV*NATURAL_N are not significant, suggesting the 
role of accounting conservatism in enhancing hedge commitment is minimal given the existence 
of interest rate protection covenants.   For derivative use in general, we find significantly a 
negative coefficient on CONSERV*NATURAL_N (z = -2.827).  Thus, the association between 
derivative use and firms’ natural hedge positions is more negative for firms with conservative 
financial reporting, suggesting conservatism may be important only for borrowers with negative 
hedge positions.  
Our results on conservatism and hedging are different from Biddle et al. (2011) in that we 
do not find an overall positive association between conservative reporting and hedging activities.  
Instead, we find that conservative financial reporting increases borrowers propensity to hedge 
only when firms have negative natural hedge positions. This asymmetric association is consistent 
with the interpretation that, in an interest-rising environment, firms with negative natural hedge 
positions have stronger incentives to manage earnings upwards because their sales revenue 
decreases with higher interest rates. Conservatism enhances hedge commitment by reducing their 
incentive to unwind their hedge positions to recognize gains in the income statement.   
For other control variables, we find larger firms are more likely to use interest rate 
derivatives, consistent with prior studies that find derivative use exhibits economies of scale 
(Geczy et al., 1997; Mian, 1996). We find firms with higher leverage ratios and better credit 
                                                
7 Ai and Norton (2003) point out that it can be difficult to interpret the interaction term in non-linear models if the 
research objective is to assess the marginal effect of an independent variable at a point other than the center of the 
distribution.  Since our purpose of including the interaction term in the bivariate probit model is to examine whether 
the impact of the natural hedge position on derivative use varies with conservatism, not to assess the absolute 
marginal effect of conservatism, it is correct to just rely on the interaction terms to draw inferences (Kolasinski and 
Siegel 2010). 
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ratings are more likely to use derivatives.  The coefficients on most of the loan specific variables 
are significant and consistent with the univariate results in Table 3.  We find borrowers are more 
likely to swap to fixed rates for loans that have longer maturity, higher number of lenders, more 
financial covenants, as well as for term loans and those sold on the secondary market.  Compared 
with the incentives for derivative use in general, we find the incentives for mandatory derivative 
use are very different.  For example, we find that mandatory users are smaller, less likely to be 
rated and have lower credit ratings when they are rated. These characteristics indicate mandatory 
users tend to be higher risk borrowers. Loans with interest rate protection covenants are also 
more likely to require collateral.  
          Table 4 Panel B reports the bivariate probit model estimation results using alternative 
conservatism measures.  The results are largely consistent with the results reported in Panel A. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that our instruments (i.e., MTR and PROP) are valid 
because they are associated with borrowers’ hedge decisions and inclusion of interest rate 
protection covenants in the loan contracts. In addition, banks especially care about borrowers’ 
commitment to hedge when the borrowers’ sales revenue negatively co-moves with interest 
rates. Such borrowers are most subject to interest rate fluctuation risk. The commitment 
mechanism can be either the interest rate protection covenants or conservative financial 
reporting. In the next section, we explore whether hedge commitments reduce firms’ funding 
costs.   
5.3. Effect of Hedge Commitments on Interest Rates 
If the commitment to maintain the hedge position is important in enhancing a borrower’s 
credit quality, the borrower should enjoy a reduction in its funding costs after it credibly commits 
to hedge. We investigate this issue using an instrumental variables approach.  We use the 
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predicted probability of USE and the predicted joint probability of both USE = 1 and MAND=1 
from the first stage bivariate probit model and estimate OLS regressions with all the explanatory 
variables from the first stage, except for the two instrumental variables, MTR and PROP.    
Table 5 Column (1) reports the second stage OLS regression results without considering 
accounting conservatism. Consistent with our first hypothesis, we find that borrowers who use 
derivatives voluntarily do not enjoy reduced interest rates on average.  The estimated coefficient 
on USE is -52.292 but is statistically insignificant (t = -1.118).  Consistent with our first 
hypothesis, we find that borrowers who credibly commit to hedge by accepting the interest rate 
protection covenants in their loan contracts enjoy significant reductions in interest rates of 63.5 
basis points (t = -2.276) relative to voluntary users and reductions of 115.8 basis points (F = 
5.26) relative to non-users. These results highlight the importance of a credible commitment to 
hedge in reducing funding costs. The results also show that an interest rate protection covenant 
serves as a credible commitment mechanism.  
Table 5 Columns (2) through (5) report test results of our second hypothesis on whether 
accounting conservatism enhances hedge commitment for voluntary users.  We find significantly 
negative coefficients on the interaction terms between accounting conservatism and voluntary 
derivative use for all four conservatism measures. This result suggests that conservatism 
enhances voluntary users’ ability to commit, resulting in lower costs of debt. Voluntary users 
who practice conservative reporting are less likely to engage in risk-shifting activities, such as 
unwinding the hedge positions in rising interest rate environments. Creditors recognize this and 
thus, factor the credit improvement into debt pricing.  
The interaction terms between accounting conservatism and mandatory derivative use are 
mostly positive and significant (except for Column (5)), offsetting the negative coefficients on 
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CONSERV*USE. We conduct F-tests on the sum of the coefficients on CONVSERV*USE and 
CONSERV*MAND, which indicates whether mandatory users save interests by practicing 
conservative reporting. The bottom of Table 5 reports the results. We find that being 
conservative does not reduce interest rates for mandatory users (except for Column (5)). This 
result is not surprising because mandatory users do not need to depend on conservative reporting 
to commit to hedge.  
The coefficient on CONSERV is in general positive and significant, consistent with the 
interpretation that firms with higher default risk are more likely to have conservative financial 
reporting due to debt contracting demands.8 The results for other control variables are consistent 
with those found in previous research.  Specifically, smaller borrowers and borrowers that have 
high leverage, low profitability, and low credit ratings are charged a higher rate.  We find larger 
spreads for loans that require collateral, for term loans, for loans later sold in the secondary 
market, and for loans used for takeovers.  We also find that loans with a longer maturity are 
charged a lower interest rate. 
In summary, Table 5 shows that voluntarily taking hedge positions without a credible 
commitment to maintain the hedge does not reduce the borrower’ funding costs. An interest rate 
protection covenant serves as a credible commitment mechanism and so does conservative 
reporting. Accounting conservatism enhances voluntary users’ hedge commitment but is not 
important for mandatory users.   
5.4 Sensitivity Tests 
 The inclusion of interest rate protection covenants could arise from certain lead 
arrangers’ preferences rather than borrowers’ characteristics.  We consider this possibility by 
                                                
8 Zhang (2008) documents a negative association between loan spreads and accounting conservatism. However, this 
negative association only applies to a sub-sample of loans without performance pricing. 
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examining whether mandatory users share the same lead arrangers.  We identify 219 unique 
banks serving as lead arrangers for the entire sample of 2,338 loans.  The 263 deals with interest 
rate protection agreements are arranged by 75 banks, and the 2,075 deals without interest rate 
protection agreements are arranged by all 219 banks.  There is no lead arranger that only 
arranges deals with interest rate protection covenants.  This result suggests that the requirement 
for borrowers to enter an interest rate protection program does not merely reflect a specific lead 
arranger’s preference. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We study how credible hedge commitments affect agency costs of debt by examining 
three types of borrowers: those required to hedge interest rate risk due to interest rate protection 
covenants, those who voluntarily hedge interest rate risk, and those who do not hedge interest 
rate risk. We find that loan contracts are more likely to require borrowers to hedge interest rate 
risk when borrowers exhibit high default risk and when borrowers’ sales revenues decrease in a 
rising interest rate environment.  We find hedge commitment through interest rate protection 
covenants reduces interest rates charges on the syndicated loans.  In contrast, we do not find 
interest savings on average for voluntary users.  However, we find accounting conservatism 
enhances voluntary users’ ability to commit to hedge and thus results in lower loan rates.   
Our finding provides large sample evidence on the importance of credible hedge 
commitments in reducing agency costs of debt. The finding is consistent with Smith and Stulz’s 
(1985) conjecture that, due to conflicts between creditors and shareholders, the benefits of 
hedging are only realizable when borrowers can credibly commit to maintain the hedge positions 
once the financing is completed. The study also extends the literature on corporate risk 
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management. We show that the assumption that derivative use is a voluntary firms choice is not 
always valid. Many bank loan agreements explicitly include interest rate protection covenants 
requiring borrowers to use derivatives to hedge interest rate risk. Reasons for mandatory 
derivative use can be very different from reasons for voluntarily derivative use.  It is thus 
important for researchers to consider whether the derivative use is out of contractual obligations 
when conducting risk management research.      
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 
 
AISD Loan spreads over LIBOR calculated for each deal.  If one deal consists of 
multiple facilities, AISD is measured as the average spreads across all the 
facilities. 
 
COMPRATE S&P rating ranging from 1 for AAA to 22 for D for firms with ratings. Set to 
missing value for firms without ratings.  
 
CONSERV_KW Decile ranking of the accounting conservatism constructed for each firm-year 
based on Khan and Watts (2009).   
  
CONSERV_AC Decile ranking of the accounting conservatism measured as the average non-
operating accruals scaled by total assets over the 3-year period before the 
loan origination.  
 
CONSERV_SK Decile ranking of the accounting conservatism measured as the difference 
between the skewness of operating cash flows scaled by total assets and the 
skewness of income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets.  The 
skewness of earnings and cash flows are calculated for the firm-year before 
the loan origination using information from the previous 12 quarters with 
minimum 5 quarters data.  
   
CONSERV Decile ranking of the principal component of the three accounting 
conservatism measures based on non-operating accruals, difference in the 
skewness of cash flows and earnings, and Khan and Watts (2009). 
  
NATURAL Firms’ natural hedge position measured as the sum of the coefficients on 
current and one period lagged 12-month treasury rates from a regression of 
sales scaled by total assets on these variables, as well as a constant, time 
trend, and log time trend. The regression is estimated at 2-digit SIC industry-
year level. This measure is similar to the natural hedge position measured in 
Vickery (2008). 
 
NATURAL_P Equals NATURAL if NATURAL > 0 and set to 0 otherwise. 
  
NATURAL_N Equals NATURAL if NATURAL < 0 and set to 0 otherwise. 
  
LEV Book leverage measured as the sum of the long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by total assets.  
 
MAND Indicator variable that equals 1 if a bank loan includes an interest rate 
protection covenant (i.e., mandatory users), 0 for non-users and for voluntary 
users. 
 
MATURE Natural log of number of months between the loan start and end date. 
 
MTR Before-financing simulated marginal tax rate. We calculate the variable using 
the coefficients estimated in Graham and Mills (2007) for predicting pre-
financing marginal tax rate. 
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PM Gross profits scaled by sales revenue.  
 
PROP Proportion of debt maturing after one year. 
  
PERFORM Indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan includes performance pricing, 0 
otherwise. 
  
RATE Indicator variable that equals 1 if a borrower has S&P credit ratings prior to 
loan origination, 0 otherwise. 
 
RD Research and development expense scaled by sales.  Set to 0 when research 
and development expense data is missing. 
 
NCOV Number of financial covenants. 
 
NLENDER Number of lenders involved in the syndicated loans. 
 
SECOND Indicator variable that equals 1 if a “Term Loan” is followed by letter A-H, 0 
otherwise. 
 
SECURE Indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan is secured, 0 otherwise. 
 
SIZE Natural log of sales revenue. 
 
SPRATE S&P rating ranging from 1 for AAA to 22 for D for firms with ratings and 
equal to 0 for firms without ratings.  
 
TAKEOVER Indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan is used for takeover purpose, 0 
otherwise. 
 
TERM Indicator variable that equals 1 if any facility is a term loan, 0 otherwise. 
 
USE Indicator variable that equals 1 if a borrower uses derivative contracts to fix 
the borrowing rate (both voluntary users and mandatory users), 0 for non-
users. 
 
 
All accounting variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to loan origination, except for 
MTR.  Before-financing marginal tax rate (MTR) is measured at the end of the fiscal year of the loan 
origination. 
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Table 1 
 Sample Description 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 
Total credit agreements identified with 10-K wizard and Tear Sheets from 1995 to 2005 10,059 
Credit agreements with COMPUSTAT coverage 4,018 
Credit agreements with at least one accounting conservatism measure and other non-
missing variables 
2,338 
Number of loans (firms) with interest rate protection covenant (mandatory users) 263 (229) 
Number of loans (firms) without interest rate protection covenant but with interest rate 
derivatives in place at time of loan initiation (voluntary users) 
709 (491) 
Number of loans (firms) without interest rate protection covenant or interest rate 
derivatives at time of loan initiation (non-users) 
1,366 (958) 
 
 
Panel B: Industry distribution of mandatory users, voluntary users and non-users 
     
 Mandatory Users 
(%) 
Voluntary Users 
(%) 
Non-Users (%) 
01-09  Agriculture 0.00 0.14 0.15 
10-19  Mining and Construction 5.32 9.73 11.56 
20-27  Food, paper, and finished goods 12.16 11.28 10.83 
28-29  Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 3.80 6.34 5.34 
30-34  Rubber, leather, and metal works 7.22 9.73 6.44 
35-36  Machinery & electronics 11.02 11.86 10.86 
37-39  Other equipment and machinery 7.98 8.46 7.54 
40-49  Transportation, telecom & utilities 19.39 15.79 13.47 
50-51  Wholesalers  3.42 5.41 4.83 
52-59  Retailers 9.50 9.87 10.54 
70-79  Personal and business services 14.45 8.60 12.66 
80-99  Other services 5.70 3.95 5.85 
Total 100 100 100 
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Table 2 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients among the main variables. All variables are defined in Appendix I. Numbers in bold indicate 1% or less level of significance. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
USE (1) 1.00 
                    MAND (2) 0.42 1.00 
                   AISD (3) 0.00 0.24 1.00 
                  MTR (4) 0.04 -0.07 -0.37 1.00 
                 PROP (5) 0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.03 1.00 
                NATURAL_P (6) 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.07 1.00 
               NATURAL_N (7) 0.06 -0.04 -0.09 0.16 0.04 0.46 1.00 
              CONSERV (8) -0.06 0.07 0.42 -0.33 -0.12 -0.12 -0.04 1.00 
             SIZE (9) 0.17 -0.14 -0.40 0.24 0.11 0.13 0.24 -0.33 1.00 
            LEV (10) 0.13 0.11 0.30 -0.28 0.16 0.06 -0.01 0.24 -0.05 1.00 
           PM (11) 0.02 -0.06 -0.19 0.09 0.16 0.02 -0.20 -0.23 -0.07 0.04 1.00 
          RATE (12) 0.13 -0.08 -0.17 -0.02 0.24 0.12 0.08 -0.18 0.57 0.25 0.12 1.00 
         SPRATE (13) 0.10 -0.01 0.04 -0.15 0.25 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.39 0.37 0.07 0.92 1.00 
        RD (14) -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.15 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.18 -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 1.00 
       SECURE (15) 0.00 0.22 0.66 -0.25 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 0.36 -0.44 0.21 -0.11 -0.22 -0.02 -0.04 1.00 
      MATURE (16) 0.15 0.20 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.10 0.06 0.08 -0.03 0.04 -0.13 0.14 1.00 
     SECOND (17) 0.18 0.32 0.41 -0.15 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.17 -0.05 0.06 0.15 -0.05 0.32 0.29 1.00 
    TERM (18) 0.17 0.34 0.44 -0.16 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.19 0.19 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.40 0.33 0.58 1.00 
   NCOV (19) 0.05 0.25 0.18 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.01 0.17 -0.28 0.07 -0.04 -0.20 -0.09 -0.07 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.31 1.00 
  NLENDER (20) 0.23 0.04 -0.31 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.09 -0.24 0.51 0.10 0.12 0.41 0.30 -0.07 -0.25 0.13 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 
 TAKEOVER (21) 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.10 0.22 0.13 0.09 0.00 1.00 
PERFORM (22) 0.08 -0.01 -0.23 0.15 0.09 -0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.08 -0.08 0.14 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.15 0.19 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 
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Table 3 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics [means and differences in means] for three types of borrowers. 
Mandatory users are borrowers whose loan contracts contain interest rate protection covenants and are 
required to hedge interest rate risk. Voluntary users are borrowers who freely choose to hedge interest rate 
risk related to the borrowing. Non-users are borrowers who do not hedge the new borrowing’s interest 
rate risk. Panel B presents distribution of main variables. All variables are defined in Appendix I.  ***, ** 
and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for bank loan borrowers by derivative use 
 
Variables 
Means for 
Mandatory 
Users 
Means for 
Voluntary 
Users  
 Means for 
Non-Users  
Mandatory 
users versus 
voluntary 
users 
Mandatory 
users 
versus non-
users 
Voluntary 
users 
versus 
non-users 
Instrumental Variables  
MTR 0.3023 0.3231    0.3142  *** *** *** 
PROP 0.8542 0.8379     0.7852      *** *** 
Firm Characteristics 
SIZE 5.874 7.211     6.2955 *** *** *** 
LEV 0.4244 0.3625     0.3058  *** *** *** 
PM 0.1281 0.1803 0.1611 *** *** *** 
RATE 0.3650 0.6417  0.4399  *** ** *** 
COMPRATE 13.000 9.683    10.604  *** *** *** 
RD  0.0084 0.0116   0.0141 * **  
CONSERV 6.056 5.013 5.645 ** *** *** 
NATURAL_P 0.0064 0.0090     0.0077     ***  ** 
NATURAL_N -0.0087 -0.0064  -0.0082  ***  *** 
Loan characteristics 
AISD 242.3 139.3 164.0  *** *** *** 
SECURE 0.9087 0.5077   0.6032  *** *** *** 
MATURE 4.043 3.732   3.639 *** *** *** 
TERM 0.8060 0.3074     0.2738  *** *** * 
SECOND 0.4753 0.1382     0.0915  *** *** *** 
NLENDER 11.283 13.119     8.744  *** *** *** 
NCOV 5.182 3.689     3.908 *** *** *** 
TAKEOVER 0.0837 0.0183   0.0168 *** ***  
PERFORM 0.5779 0.6657     0.5571 **  *** 
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Panel B: Distribution of main variables 
 
Variables N Mean STD 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
MTR 2338 0.3156 0.0584 0.171 0.290 0.345 0.345 0.371 
PROP 2338 0.8090 0.2604 0 0.7407 0.9255 0.9849 1 
NATURAL_P 2338 0.0079 0.0123 0 0 0 0.0132 0.0418 
NATURAL_N 2338 -0.0077 0.0108 -0.0328 -0.0270 -0.0026 0 0 
SIZE 2338 6.526 1.649 2.184 5.459 6.455 7.798 10.280 
LEV 2338 0.3363 0.2506 0.0022 0.1789 0.3081 0.4411 1.0964 
PM 2338 0.1632 0.1619 -0.3934 0.0849 0.1397 0.2187 0.6697 
RATE 2338 0.4927 0.5001 0 0 0 1 1 
SPRATE 2338 5.144 5.669 0 0 0 10 16 
RD  2338 0.0127 0.0327 0 0 0 0.0088 0.1700 
AISD 2338 165.3 112.8 20 75 150 250 555 
SECURE 2338 0.6086 0.4881 0 0 1 1 1 
MATURE 2338 3.712 0.568 1.792 3.584 3.871 4.094 4.331 
TERM 2338 0.3438 0.4751 0 0 0 1 1 
SECOND 2338 0.1488 0.3560 0 0 0 0 1 
NLENDER 2338 10.356 9.147 1 3 8 14 44 
NCOV 2338 3.984 1.740 1 3 4 5 7 
TAKEOVER 2338 0.0248 0.1556 0 0 0 0 1 
PERFORM 2338 0.5923 0.4914 0 0 1 1 1 
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Table 4 
 Bivariate Probit Models for Derivative Users and Mandatory Users 
 
Table 4 reports bivariate probit model regression results. Panel A presents estimation results when 
accounting conservatism is measured as the principal component of the three accounting conservatism 
measures: Khan and Watts (2009), differences in skewness of earnings and cash flows, and non-operating 
accruals. Panel B presents estimation results using alternative conservatism measures. Estimated 
coefficients on firm and loan characteristics are omitted in Panel B for presentation purpose. z-stats are in 
brackets.  All variables are defined in Appendix I. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Bivariate probit model regression results where accounting conservatism is measured as 
the principal component of CONSERV_KW, CONSERV_AC, and CONSERV_SK. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 USE MAND USE MAND USE MAND 
MTR 
  
0.894 0.309 1.089* 0.041 1.094* 0.214 
[1.632] [0.431] [1.824] [0.051] [1.704] [0.255] 
PROP 
  
0.300** 0.353** 0.254** 0.310* 0.255* 0.263 
[2.549] [2.130] [2.077] [1.882] [1.793] [1.217] 
NATURAL_P 
  
0.222 0.875 -0.567 -1.310 -10.752 13.942 
[0.070] [0.196] [-0.157] [-0.282] [-1.356] [0.917] 
NATURAL_N 
  
-2.950 -10.130* -2.595 -12.104** 17.561 -21.489* 
[-0.691] [-1.691] [-0.586] [-2.036] [1.642] [-1.762] 
CONSERV 
    
0.001 -0.008 -0.039* 0.016 
[0.049] [-0.474] [-1.921] [0.492] 
CONSERV* 
NATURAL_P  
 
 
 
   
1.765 -2.169 
[1.269] [-0.827] 
CONSERV* 
NATURAL_N  
 
 
 
   
-3.343*** 0.976 
[-2.827] [0.636] 
Firm Characteristics 
 
SIZE 
 
0.103*** -0.080** 0.092*** -0.102*** 0.093*** -0.100*** 
[3.762] [-2.278] [3.061] [-2.692] [3.423] [-3.629] 
LEV 
 
0.805*** 0.396** 0.726*** 0.207 0.735*** 0.161 
[4.355] [2.062] [5.352] [1.135] [5.070] [1.137] 
PM 
 
-0.194 -0.343 -0.074 -0.173 -0.008 -0.153 
[-0.956] [-1.508] [-0.322] [-0.637] [-0.037] [-0.521] 
RATE 
 
0.646*** -0.913*** 0.682*** -0.814* 0.666*** -0.838*** 
[3.332] [-2.889] [3.295] [-1.860] [3.511] [-2.769] 
SPRATE 
 
-0.065*** 0.048* -0.066*** 0.046 -0.065*** 0.049** 
[-3.963] [1.947] [-3.930] [1.387] [-4.218] [2.361] 
RD 
 
-1.218 -0.594 -1.057 -0.437 -1.081 -0.812 
[-1.236] [-0.512] [-0.958] [-0.260] [-0.962] [-0.490] 
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Loan Characteristics 
SECURE 
 
0.098 0.296** 0.088 0.356*** 0.090 0.370** 
[1.323] [2.517] [1.123] [2.807] [1.341] [2.499] 
MATURE 
 
0.198*** 0.210* 0.182*** 0.241** 0.174* 0.224 
[3.260] [1.902] [2.822] [2.030] [1.825] [1.391] 
SECOND 
 
0.243** 0.402*** 0.167 0.359*** 0.188** 0.357*** 
[2.454] [3.551] [1.644] [3.139] [2.028] [3.597] 
TERM 
 
0.334*** 0.521*** 0.372*** 0.545*** 0.371*** 0.558*** 
[4.395] [4.929] [4.673] [4.813] [3.816] [5.823] 
NCOV 
 
0.053*** 0.143*** 0.057*** 0.154*** 0.056** 0.154*** 
[2.661] [5.220] [2.643] [5.023] [2.367] [5.381] 
NLENDER 
 
0.016*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
[4.077] [3.198] [5.027] [3.951] [5.116] [3.488] 
TAKEOVER 
 
0.110 0.382* 0.162 0.415* 0.203 0.414 
[0.580] [1.911] [0.830] [1.915] [0.758] [0.975] 
PERFORM 
 
0.163*** 0.026 0.137** 0.028 0.137*** 0.033 
[2.734] [0.322] [2.169] [0.320] [3.051] [0.689] 
INTERCEPT 
 
-2.401*** -2.902*** -2.540*** -2.856*** -2.309*** -3.065*** 
[-4.361] [-4.360] [-3.852] [-3.034] [-2.843] [-4.847] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2338 2338 2,125 2,125 2,125 2,125 
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Panel B: Bivariate probit model regression results based on alternative conservatism measures 
 
 CONSERV_KW CONSERV_SK CONSERV_AC 
 USE MAND USE MAND USE MAND USE MAND USE MAND USE MAND 
MTR 
1.018* 0.397 1.050* 0.644 0.823 0.212 0.892* 0.092 0.907 -0.128 0.932 -0.098 
[1.807] [0.537] [1.802] [0.846] [1.459] [0.290] [1.671] [0.097] [1.595] [-0.183] [1.593] [-0.128] 
PROP 
0.291** 0.316** 0.314** 0.332 0.278** 0.346** 0.273* 0.322 0.255** 0.308** 0.254* 0.305 
[2.456] [1.961] [2.187] [1.588] [2.303] [1.983] [1.843] [1.466] [2.145] [2.157] [1.777] [1.482] 
NATURAL_P 
-0.694 -0.551 -3.568 16.479** 0.668 1.186 -13.713* -5.852 -1.241 -0.386 -0.107 8.593 
[-0.211] [-0.118] [-0.463] [2.014] [0.191] [0.250] [-1.666] [-0.507] [-0.367] [-0.082] [-0.021] [1.124] 
NATURAL_N 
-3.960 -11.314** 22.911** -0.687 -2.339 -8.993 14.388 -10.716 -2.745 -13.704** -0.645 -14.300 
[-0.919] [-1.984] [2.251] [-0.046] [-0.546] [-1.594] [1.325] [-0.695] [-0.625] [-2.293] [-0.080] [-1.128] 
CONSERV 
0.023 0.027 -0.015 0.028 -0.008 -0.018 -0.050*** -0.024 -0.007 -0.020 -0.008 -0.008 
[1.458] [1.257] [-0.507] [1.140] [-0.774] [-1.256] [-2.635] [-0.995] [-0.632] [-1.429] [-0.650] [-0.343] 
NATURAL_P 
*CONSERV 
  
  
  
  
0.372 -2.622*  
 
 
 
2.576** 1.358  
 
 
 
-0.260 -1.805 
[0.323] [-1.861] [2.001] [0.730] [-0.477] [-1.067] 
NATRUAL_N 
*CONSERV 
  
  
  
  
-4.856*** -2.435  
 
 
 
-2.841** 0.099  
 
 
 
-0.369 0.166 
[-5.292] [-1.588] [-2.385] [0.049] [-0.674] [0.105] 
 
Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2292 2292 2292 2292 2243 2243 2243 2243 2216 2216 2216 2216 
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Table 5 
Effects of Interest Rate Protection Covenants and Accounting Conservatism on the Interest Rates 
of Syndicated Loans  
 
Table 5 reports analysis of the impact of interest rate protection covenants and accounting conservatism 
on loan interest rates (as a spread over LIBOR). The dependent variable is loan spread. We use an 
instrumental variables approach to address the endogeneity problem. We employ two instruments, 
marginal tax rate (MTR) and proportion of debt maturing after one year (PROP).  See Table 4 for the first 
stage results. All variables are defined in Appendix I. Reported in brackets are t-statistics calculated based 
on White heteroskedastic consistent standard errors and adjusted for clustering by company. ***, ** and * 
represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
Variables  CONSERV 
CONSERV 
_KW 
CONSERV 
_SK 
CONSERV 
_AC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
USE -52.292 -51.375 -67.968 -36.049 -68.397 
[-1.118] [-0.942] [-1.289] [-0.635] [-1.232] 
MAND -63.522** -102.114*** -76.759** -100.960*** -58.862* 
[-2.276] [-2.787] [-2.070] [-3.047] [-1.693] 
USE * 
CONSERVE  
-14.704*** -14.956*** -12.101*** -8.551** 
[-3.545] [-3.293] [-3.271] [-2.182] 
MAND * 
CONSERVE   
10.789*** 8.785** 7.197** 1.624 
[2.624] [1.962] [2.062] [0.417] 
CONSERVE 
  
 
 
8.020*** 12.825*** 5.869*** 2.301 
[4.609] [6.592] [3.640] [1.452] 
Firm Characteristics 
SIZE -8.434*** -4.428 1.695 -7.106*** -5.803* 
[-3.336] [-1.560] [0.547] [-2.602] [-1.944] 
LEV 77.382*** 87.568*** 80.577*** 88.542*** 94.551*** 
[5.130] [5.321] [5.205] [5.036] [5.479] 
PM -93.545*** -74.482*** -71.712*** -90.963*** -94.100*** 
[-6.747] [-4.838] [-5.348] [-6.130] [-6.043] 
RATE -74.145*** -54.510*** -43.961*** -59.450*** -61.906*** 
[-4.842] [-3.172] [-2.634] [-3.397] [-3.751] 
SPRATE 6.149*** 4.334*** 3.551** 4.797*** 4.823*** 
[4.355] [2.734] [2.282] [2.971] [3.066] 
RD -87.865 -109.715* -35.497 -103.475* -102.542* 
[-1.541] [-1.893] [-0.602] [-1.800] [-1.711] 
NATURAL_P -35.175 42.487 -254.864 107.303 -171.103 
[-0.198] [0.216] [-1.399] [0.556] [-0.924] 
NATURAL_N -97.047 68.047 -120.595 16.294 127.925 
[-0.387] [0.245] [-0.458] [0.064] [0.450] 
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Loan characteristics 
SECURE 83.517*** 82.685*** 78.064*** 85.644*** 84.850*** 
[20.359] [19.089] [18.324] [19.677] [19.804] 
MATURE -21.226*** -17.483*** -14.178*** -17.392*** -17.626*** 
[-4.426] [-3.459] [-2.892] [-3.453] [-3.350] 
SECOND 64.443*** 62.883*** 67.977*** 66.303*** 65.109*** 
[7.724] [7.741] [8.162] [7.872] [7.594] 
TERM 42.246*** 53.611*** 50.040*** 49.045*** 51.835*** 
[5.731] [6.042] [6.360] [5.867] [5.934] 
NCOV 3.487** 4.758*** 4.960*** 4.260** 4.703*** 
[2.346] [2.913] [3.314] [2.573] [2.851] 
NLENDER -0.380 0.203 0.277 0.016 0.087 
[-1.081] [0.442] [0.700] [0.036] [0.204] 
TAKEOVER 37.046*** 43.406*** 38.197*** 40.206*** 44.391*** 
[4.209] [4.360] [4.035] [4.497] [4.540] 
PERFORM -18.230*** -12.268*** -9.517** -14.679*** -14.173*** 
[-4.328] [-2.765] [-2.092] [-3.217] [-3.151] 
INTERCEPT 266.478*** 244.936*** 169.428*** 275.715*** 296.402*** 
[9.752] [7.908] [4.740] [9.656] [9.781] 
 
Year FE 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-squared 0.637 0.649 0.652 0.648 0.642 
Observations 2,338 2,125 2,292 2,243 2,216 
F-test of USE*CONSERV + 
MAND*CONSERV 
 
F=0.72 
 
 
F=2.07 
 
F=1.85 
 
F=3.72* 
 
 
 
 
